

AECOB/7

1. Unilateral operation by CIA (AECOB/7 is also an agent of the Swedish IS)
2. Locale: Latvian SSR
3. Adversary Service - RIS

Our target: Latvian SSR

4. Agent is about 37 years old (born 1919 or 1920); Latvian, male, middle class, high school graduate, studied construction engineering. Had no specific political affiliations in the past; showed a strictly national, independent attitude while in Sweden in 1949. He has been a leader in the Latvian anti-Communist underground movement for a number of years. He had attempted to establish contact with the AIS several times in the past, but had been unsuccessful. Contact was finally established through one of our covert associates, who had been a personal friend of AECOB/7 in the past.
5. AECOB/7 independently exfiltrated from the LATVIAN SSR to Sweden in 1949. He was recruited and trained by the Swedish IS and infiltrated into Latvia in 1950. AECOB/7 is presently operating in Riga and apparently has sufficient assets available to enable him to furnish fairly high-grade intelligence to the Swedish IS with whom he is in two-way W/T contact. We have been able to monitor AECOB/7 and SIS traffic.
6. AECOB/7 was recruited by CIA without the knowledge of the Swedish IS, in 1956. There is no definite proof that AECOB/7 has ever been recruited by the RIS, but there is strong suspicion, both at Headquarters and at the [redacted] that he might be RIS-controlled. The manner in which AECOB/7, and later on his courier, were exfiltrated from and again infiltrated into Latvia showed marked similarities with the cases of some known RIS agents.
7. Objectives: a. To receive positive intelligence reports from a presumed RIS source.  
b. It was necessary to recruit AECOB/7 in order to protect his courier, AECOB/10, who exfiltrated to Sweden in 1956. The latter had the assignment of establishing contact with the AIS in behalf of AECOB/7. AECOB/10 was recruited by CIA as an independent agent and was briefed to report to AECOB/7 upon his return to Latvia, that he had had contact with AIS, had received money, and was to hand over all equipment and instructions for maintaining communications to AECOB/7 for the latter's sole use. However, he was not to reveal to AECOB/7 the fact that he himself had been recruited and had been given a two-way S/W system for maintaining communications with the AIS.

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8. Problems: To determine whether AECOB/7 is definitely RIS-controlled.

9. Achievements: Since AECOB/7 was only recruited several months ago, it is too soon to report on any achievements in this operation. Several S/W messages have been received from him, but the information has not yet been evaluated.

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